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I. INTRODUCTION 
Adulthood is a social construct. For that matter, so is childhood. 
But like all social constructs, they have real consequences. They 
determine who is legally responsible for their actions and who is 
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not, what roles people are allowed to assume in society, how 
people view each other, and how they view themselves. But 
even in the realms where it should be easiest to define the dif-
ference—law, physical development—adulthood defies simplici-
ty.
1
 
 
When does a juvenile legally become an adult? This is literally a life-
or-death question because the United States Supreme Court held that the 
Constitution prohibits the imposition of capital punishment on a juvenile.
2
  
Despite the enormous consequences, the Supreme Court has spent 
little time defining what it means to be a juvenile.
3
 Instead, the Court has 
simply accepted the relatively recently adopted conventional wisdom that a 
person is considered an adult on his or her eighteenth birthday.
4
 
But there is no rational or scientific basis for drawing the line between 
being an adult and being a juvenile at age eighteen. Indeed, recent scien-
tific research—the same brain research the United States Supreme Court 
has used to adopt legal principles that both protect and harm adolescents— 
proves that brain maturation actually occurs from ages ten to twenty-
seven.
5
  
This article will explore whether the line between a juvenile and an 
adult should remain at eighteen. It begins by exploring the history of dis-
tinguishing childhood from adulthood.
6
 Next, this article details the legal 
system’s differing treatment of certain ages.
7
 Then, it details the criminal 
justice system’s treatment of persons below the age of eighteen. 
8
 Next, this 
article discusses the science behind cognitive development.
9
 Then, it dis-
cusses Supreme Court decisions that affect rights of individuals based on 
age.
10
 Finally, the article concludes that drawing the line of adulthood at 
 
 1. Julie Beck, When Are You Really an Adult?, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 5, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/01/when-are-you-really-an-adult/422487/ 
[https://perma.cc/32YT-CY52]. 
 2. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 3. See id. at 574 (“The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disap-
pear when an individual turns 18 . . . however, a line must be drawn.”). 
 4. See id. (“The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many pur-
poses between childhood and adulthood.”). 
 5. See Brief for American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636447. 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. See infra Part IV. 
 9. See infra Part V. 
 10. See infra Part VI. 
2
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age eighteen without consideration of an individual’s characteristics is arbi-
trary under the Constitution.
11
  
II. HISTORY OF ADULTHOOD: SHIFTING BETWEEN MENTAL AND 
PHYSICAL CAPACITY  
Historically, society has fluctuated in how it determines when a child 
becomes an adult. The concepts of who is classified as a child and what 
emotional, physical, and intellectual properties a child is assumed to pos-
sess have adjusted in response to societal changes.
12
  
In early Roman law, society set the age of adulthood when a person 
obtained “intellectual capacit[y] required to exercise full citizenship, man-
age their affairs, and become parents and the heads of families themselves 
[at] age fifteen for males.”
13
 But the Romans did not assume a person’s 
physical capacity meant they had full intellectual maturity.   
Roman law placed free males who were technically “of full years 
and rights” [at puberty] under the temporary guardianship of 
adults known as Curatores. A Curator’s approval was required 
to validate young males’ formal acts or contracts until they 
reached twenty-five years of age. Indeed, Roman law used the 
terms “minority” and “majority” in reference, not to age fifteen, 
but instead to age twenty-five—the age of . . . full maturity.
14
 
So, while the Romans acknowledged physical capacity for some 
rights, legal rights constituting full autonomy were restrained until an indi-
vidual was considered intellectually mature. 
On the other hand, developing Western societies emphasized one’s 
ability to perform in the military to determine their age of majority.
15
 In 
Medieval Europe, there were only adults and infants,
16
 and the primary 
characterization between adults and infants was their physical dependence 
 
 11. See infra Part VII. 
 12. Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Or-
der: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1093 (1991). 
 13. Vivian E. Hamilton, Adulthood in Law and Culture, 91 TUL. L. REV. 55, 63 
(2016). During this era, the onset of puberty signaled the “physical capacity” to become 
parents. Id.  
 14. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 15. See T.E. James, The Age of Majority, 4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 22, 23 (1960). 
 16. PHILIPPE ARIÈS, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY 
LIFE 128 (Robert Baldick trans., 1962) (“In medieval society the idea of childhood did not 
exist . . . . The . . . awareness of the particular nature of childhood . . . which distinguishes 
the child from the adult . . . was lacking.”). 
3
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on others to survive.
17
 Once a child was physically independent, they were 
considered full-functioning members of society with legal rights.
18
  
At this time and place, a person’s physical independence directly cor-
related to their ability to participate in warfare.
19
 While no specific age was 
set by law, attaining the physical capacity to participate in warfare was gen-
erally around age fifteen.
20
  
But later, the needs of the military changed; suits of armor became 
heavier and weapons became more lethal.
21
 As a result, younger males 
were no longer physically capable of handling weapons required for war. 
The change in the nature of military required more physical development, 
so “[t]he age of eligibility for knighthood (the equivalent of the age of ma-
jority at the time) increased to twenty-one.”
22
  
Over time, English law makers developed a structure that assigned 
criminal and civil liabilities—including the ability to work, inherit family es-
tates, and commit a crime—on societal age lines.
23
 Deriving the difference 
between juveniles and adults from the age of knighthood, England deter-
mined the age of adulthood to be twenty-one.
24
 There was no considera-
tion of mental capabilities tied to adult rights.
25
  
 
 17. Id. at 329 (explaining physical dependence typically ended around age seven).  
 18. Id. “Children”—at least those over the age of seven in mid-16th century England—
were treated the same as adults because society lacked the idea that children were different 
or had different needs. HOLLY BREWER, BY BIRTH OR CONSENT: CHILDREN, LAW, AND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN AUTHORITY 1 (2005). People over the age of sev-
en were of “ripe age” to marry and could drink in taverns, eight-year-olds could be hanged, 
and teenagers were routinely elected to Parliament. Id. 
 19. See Hamilton, supra note 13, at 63 (“When the nature of warfare changed during 
the Middle Ages so did the age of majority.”). 
 20. See James, supra note 15, at 22 (“Gothic kings seem frequently to have come of 
age at fifteen.”). In France, childhood ended at seventeen when youth were “then judged 
strong enough and sufficiently qualified for the culture of their lands, the mechanic arts and 
commerce in which they were all employed.” Id. See also Hamilton, supra note 13, at 63 
(“The age of majority between the ninth and eleventh centuries was fifteen for males.”). 
 21. See Hamilton, supra note 13, at 63. 
 22. Id. at 63–64. 
 23. The movement towards determining the mental capabilities of adolescents came 
from the Enlightenment Period where John Locke and philosophers began using reason 
and scientific developments to show children were different from adults in their inherent 
vulnerability and lower mental capacity. See Ainsworth, supra note 12, at 1093–94. 
 24. James, supra note 15, at 33. Historically, European countries used physical capac-
ity to set the age of adulthood, i.e., when a person was physically independent of their par-
ents, they were considered full-functioning members of society. See ARIÈS, supra note 16, 
at 329. When a man could participate in warfare, he was considered an adult. Id. For Eng-
land, the military armor was heavy and advanced insofar that the age of military participa-
4
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The United States adopted the age of twenty-one as the age of adult-
hood during the American Revolution.
26
 But the age of adulthood in the 
United States has also fluctuated, changing over the years and varying 
among states. When the age of twenty-one for adulthood was implement-
ed, the governments did not question whether a person was physically or 
mentally capable of adult activities
27
—it was simply the societal norm.
28
  
Twenty-one remained the age of adulthood until well into the twenti-
eth century.
29
 Then, in 1942, similar to England’s rationale, the changing 
needs of the military dictated a change in the age of adulthood. During 
World War II the military needed more bodies; as a result, Congress low-
ered the draft age to eighteen.
30
 In doing so, Congress did not consider if 
eighteen-year-olds were mature enough to participate
31
—they simply need-
ed more bodies.
32
  
Lowering the draft age to eighteen created a notable difference be-
tween being eligible for the draft and other adult responsibilities, including 
 
tion was raised to twenty-one. Id. See generally Tamar Schapiro, What Is a Child?, 109 
ETHICS 715 (1999) (discussing age-line creation and the nature of adult-child distinction). 
 25. See ARIÈS, supra note 16, at 128, 329.   
 26. See 1 DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 980 (rev. 2d ed. 2005) 
(detailing the traditional British common law age of majority at twenty-one in most Ameri-
can states until the passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment); see also Ex parte Petterson, 
166 F. 536, 546 (D. Minn. 1908) (“By the common law the age of majority is fixed at 21 for 
both sexes, and, in the absence of any statute to the contrary, every person under that age, 
whether male or female, is an infant . . . .”). 
 27. See Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 547, 559 (2000) (“The designation of a categorical legal age of majority can be under-
stood as reflecting a crude judgment about maturity and competence.”). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See Baril v. Baril, 354 A.2d 392, 396 (Me. 1976) (“At common law the age at 
which a person’s status changed from that of an infant or minor to that of an adult in the 
case of both sexes was twenty-one years, regardless of physique, mentality, education, expe-
rience or accomplishments.”); Thomas v. Couch, 156 S.E. 206, 206 (Ga. 1930) (“One be-
comes of full age on first moment of day preceding twenty-first anniversary of birth . . . .”); 
Fitzhugh v. Dennington, 2 Lord Raymond 1094, 1096, 92 E.R. 225, 226 (KB 1704) (noting 
that “twenty-one years . . . is of age”). 
 30. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76–783, 54 Stat. 885 
(1940) (establishing a national draft) (also known as Burke-Wadsworth Act); see Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, Statement on Signing the Bill Reducing the Draft Age (Nov. 13, 1942), in 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (John Wooley & Gerhard Peters eds.), 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/210187 [https://perma.cc/4B7R-MYNN]. 
 31. See Universal Military Training: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Armed 
Servs., 80th Cong. 2 (1948) (statement by George C. Marshall, U.S. Sec. of Def.) (“[W]e 
[the United States] must find some method of maintaining a sufficient military posture, one 
sufficiently strong without the terrific expense of a large standing Military Establishment.”). 
 32. See id. 
5
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the right to vote. Eighteen-year-olds could be drafted and killed in a war, 
but they could not vote for their president who was sending them to war.
33
 
This discrepancy created a furor, so Congress moved to lower the age of 
adulthood across the board.
34
 Soon, the age of eighteen began to replace 
the age of twenty-one across a range of contexts and has since been adopt-
ed as the age of adulthood.
35
  
Throughout these age-classification transitions, no one inquired as to 
whether people were mentally mature enough to vote, serve in the mili-
tary, or receive other adult rights—society simply deemed the treatment to 
be unfair given their military participation.
36
 
While the age of eighteen is a general guideline for being an adult 
and is used by the majority of states, each state has a different definition of 
what classifies a person as an adult—especially in the criminal context.
37
 Six-
teen states use fourteen as the cutoff age for trying youths as adults, while 
six states set the bar at thirteen.
38
 Kansas and Vermont allow ten-year-olds 
 
 33. See Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and 
Consistent Vision of Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & 
POL’Y 290, 296 (2006). 
 34. The 26th Amendment and the Progressive Constitution, CONST. 
ACCOUNTABILITY CTR. (March 24, 2011), https://www.theusconstitution.org/blog/the-26th-
amendment-and-the-progressive-constitution/ [https://perma.cc/VPE5-8PS3]. President 
Dwight Eisenhower became the first president to publicly voice support for amending the 
minimum voting age. “For years our citizens between the ages of 18 and 21 have, in time of 
peril, been summoned to fight for America. They should participate in the political process 
that produces this fateful summons.” Id. 
 35. See Hamilton, supra note 13, at 65; Termination of Support- Age of Majori-
ty, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS. (May 6, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-
services/termination-of-child-support-age-of-majority.aspx [https://perma.cc/UMD5-3NQA] 
(listing statutory citations for the ages of majority of each U.S. state and territory). 
 36. See Michael Philip Rosenthal, The Minimum Drinking Age for Young People: 
An Observation, 92 DICK. L. REV. 649, 653 (1988). 
 37. See Anne Teigen, Juvenile Age of Jurisdiction and Transfer to Adult Court Laws, 
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS. (Jan. 11, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-
justice/juvenile-age-of-jurisdiction-and-transfer-to-adult-court-laws.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/JF5J-SGUR] (showing varying ages of certifying children to adult court 
from 15 to 18); Thirteen States Have No Minimum Age for Adult Prosecution of Chil-
dren, EQUAL JUST. INSTITUTE (Sept. 16, 2016)¸ https://eji.org/news/13-states-lack-
minimum-age-for-trying-kids-as-adults [https://perma.cc/E8CR-N8NB]; see e.g., MINN. 
STAT. § 609.055, subdiv. 2 (2018) (“Children under the age of 14 years are incapable of 
committing crime.”). 
 38. Mary Wood, Standards Needed for Juvenile Confessions, Panelists Say, UNIV. 
VA. SCH. L. (Feb. 16, 2005), http://content.law.virginia.edu/news/2005_spr/ps_juvenile.htm 
[https://perma.cc/U6CV-PHFS]. 
6
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to be tried as adults,
39
 and twenty-three other states have no age cutoff, also 
allowing ten-year-olds to be tried as adults.
40
 When classifying an event as 
“adult,” the physical act itself can dictate an age of adulthood;
41
 other times 
it is the youth’s mental ability.
42
  
The history of differentiating between adults and juveniles reveals that 
there has been a lack of consistency in making this crucial determination, 
and no rational basis for making the distinction.  
III. ADULTHOOD AND CRIMINALITY 
The difference between an adult and a juvenile is perhaps most pro-
nounced in the criminal justice system. For a variety of reasons, juveniles 
are given special protection—such as freedom from capital punishment—as 
well as denied certain rights, like the right to a jury trial.
43
 
Generally, when a person turns eighteen, criminal justice systems 
consider that person to be an adult, and they are no longer afforded the 
same protective rights as a juvenile.
44
 This means that an eighteen-year-old 
is subject to adult court, including possibly being subjected to the death 
penalty.
45
 Despite the enormous consequences, there is no rational or sci-
entific basis for distinguishing between a person who has just turned eight-
een and person who is about to turn eighteen; in fact, there could not be a 
 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id.  
 41. See MINN. STAT. § 624.7181, subdiv. 2 (2018) (“A person under the age of 21 
who carries a semiautomatic military-style assault weapon . . . on or about the person in a 
public place is guilty of a felony.”); MINN. STAT. § 240.25, subdiv. 8 (2018) (“A person un-
der the age of 18 may not place a bet . . . or participate in card playing at a card club at a 
licensed racetrack.”); MINN. STAT. § 97B.021, subdiv. 1 (2018) (noting that children under 
sixteen years of age may possess a firearm if accompanied by a parent, and that if they are 
fourteen or fifteen, they must also have obtained a firearms safety certificate).  
 42. See, e.g., Michael A. Corriero & Alison M. Hamanjian, Advancing Juvenile Jus-
tice Reform in New York A Proposed Model, N.Y. St. B.J. 20, 22 (2008) (“In Roper, the 
Supreme Court recognized the developmental differences of minors under 18 as an ac-
cepted societal factor in determining the appropriate treatment of juvenile offenders, 
thereby officially acknowledging the conclusions of behavioral scientists as to the dimin-
ished capacity and culpability of adolescents.”). 
 43. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (holding that a juvenile 
is not guaranteed the right to a jury trial under the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments). 
 44. See Juvenile vs Adult Justice, PBS FRONTLINE, 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/juvenile/stats/juvvsadult.html 
[https://perma.cc/3WSH-5UXP]. 
 45. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the death penalty is 
unconstitutional for persons under the age of eighteen at the time of their capital offense). 
7
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rational or scientific basis because the difference between the two could 
literally be a matter of seconds.  
A. Age-Based Criminal Culpability 
William Blackstone,
46
 an English lawmaker, wrote one of the earliest 
records for defining the age line in criminality. Blackstone identified young 
children as incapable of committing a crime due to their mental capacity
47
 
and established two age lines: seven and fourteen.
48
 Children under the age 
of seven were considered too young to completely understand their ac-
tions;
49
 thus, they could not form the “vicious will” necessary to commit a 
crime and could not be charged.
50
 Children aged seven through fourteen 
“were presumed to lack any criminal capacity, but this presumption could 
be rebutted.”
51
 No one over the age of fourteen could raise infancy or im-
maturity as a defense.
52
 Blackstone’s classification was based on his gener-
alized view of the mental capacity of varying age groups in their ability to 
understand their wrongdoing.
53
  
 
 46. William Blackstone was one of the most important English lawyers during the 
time of the American Revolution. See Sir William Blackstone, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Feb. 
10, 2019), https://www.britannica.com/biography/William-Blackstone 
[https://perma.cc/2NYQ-QMY9]. 
 47. See AM. BAR ASS’N  DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 5 
(2007), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/DYJpart1.authch
eckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FVN-J9RL] (citation omitted) (“Two things were required 
to hold someone accountable for a crime. First, the person had to have a ‘vicious will’ (that 
is, the intent to commit a crime). Second, the person had to commit an unlawful act. If ei-
ther the will or the act was lacking, no crime was committed.”).  
 48. Children under the age of seven were considered too young to completely under-
stand their actions and could not form the “vicious will” necessary to commit a crime. See  
AM. BAR ASS’N DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., supra note 47, at 1. Children aged seven through 
fourteen were presumed incapable of crime, but this presumption could be rebutted. See 
id. No one over the age of fourteen could raise infancy or immaturity as a defense. See id.; 
DAVID L. MYERS, EXCLUDING VIOLENT YOUTHS FROM JUVENILE COURT THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGISLATIVE WAIVER 12 (2001). 
 49. See Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (“At common law, children un-
der seven were considered incapable of possessing criminal intent.”). 
 50. See  AM. BAR ASS’N DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., supra note 47, at 1. 
 51. MYERS, supra note 48, at 12. 
 52. Id. 
 53. AM. BAR ASS’N DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., supra note 47, at 5 (quoting Blackstone) 
(“But by the law, as it now stands . . . the capacity of doing ill, or of contracting guilt, is not 
so much measured by years and days, as by the strength of the delinquent’s understanding 
and judgment.”). 
8
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Blackstone’s age lines are present in the criminal system today—
especially as they relate to mental culpability. The modern criminal justice 
system considers one’s mental state in a variety of crimes, such as first-
degree murder.
54
 Criminal culpability assumes that a person must, or 
should, know the wrongfulness of the act or be able to form the specific 
mens rea required to commit a crime.
55
 Although ages vary, every state has 
an exception that, depending on the circumstances, limits the criminal re-
sponsibility of  youth.
56
 
The most significant changes to age-based criminality occurred in the 
twentieth century. The first juvenile court was established in Cook County, 
Illinois, in 1899.
57
 Here, a progressive reform movement sought to change 
the way the legal system treated youths.
58
 Theoretically, the juvenile court 
was designed to identify underlying causes of behavior and provide neces-
sary treatment to prevent future serious misbehavior.
59
 The driving motive 
behind the juvenile court was to intervene in a minor’s life when they were 
still amenable to change and to “save [them] from a downward career.”
60
  
However, from the 1980s to the early 1990s, there was an increase in 
crimes committed by young people, and youth crime arrest rates increased 
 
 54. See MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a)(1) (2018) (emphasis added) (stating that whoever 
“causes the death of a human being with premeditation and with intent to effect the death 
of the person” is guilty of murder in the first degree). 
 55. Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA 
L. REV. 503, 509 (1984). 
 56. See Corriero, supra note 42, at 21; Jeffrey Fagan, This Will Hurt Me More Than 
It Hurts You: Social and Legal Consequences of Criminalizing Delinquency, 16 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1, 11 (2002). But see Marcy Mistrett & Jeree Thomas, A 
Campaign Approach to Challenging the Prosecution of Youth as Adults, 62 S.D.L. Rev. 
559, 560 (2017); State Snapshot, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, 
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/state-work/state-snapshot [https://perma.cc/T34K-
FPS2]. 
 57. See GAULT: WHAT NOW FOR THE JUVENILE COURT? 2 (Virginia Nordin ed. 
1968) (referencing Act of April 21, 1899, Ill. Laws, § 21, p. 137 (1899)); see also SAMUEL 
M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2d ed. 2006); Laurence 
Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 
47, 49 (2009). But see COLO. LAWS ch. 136 § 4 (1899) (explaining that statute that came 
two months prior to Illinois protecting children between the ages of eight and fourteen).   
 58. Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The 
Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 323–
75 (1991). 
 59. MYERS, supra note 48, at 14. 
 60. Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967); see also Douglas R. Rendleman, 
Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L. REV 205, 212 (1973). 
9
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by seventy-five percent.
61
 During this period, there was also an increase in 
homicides committed by people under the age of eighteen.
62
 As a result, 
the state began punitively charging young individuals.
63
 During this time, 
more minors were being tried as adults in adult court.
64
 Historically, courts 
had the discretion to transfer the minor to adult court following an assess-
ment of the crime and the individual’s culpability.
65
 Unfortunately, today 
many minors are automatically transferred to adult court based on their 
age and criminal act without an assessment.
66
 In fact, each year, over 
200,000 juveniles under eighteen are prosecuted in adult courts.
67
 Many of 
these cases are transferred without any assessment of individual mental 
culpability.
68
 
B. Minnesota: The Importance of Age in Determining and Addressing 
Criminality  
Today, an adult in Minnesota is defined as a person eighteen years of 
age or older,
69
 while a minor is any individual under the age of eighteen.
70
 
A child under the age of fourteen is considered incapable of committing a 
 
 61. JAMES C. HOWELL, JUV. JUST. & YOUTH VIOLENCE 75 (1997) (referencing 
SNYDER & TAMAGATA, NAT’L CTR FOR JUV. JUST., JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 
1996 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 14 (1996)). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See MYERS, supra note 48, at 19 (“In contrast to the conventional juvenile court’s 
emphasis on ‘child saving’ and serving the ‘best interests of children’ . . . reforms reflect[ed] 
a perceived need to ‘get tough’ with violent adolescents.”). 
 64. CAROL J. DEFRANCES & KEVIN J. STROM, JUVENILES PROSECUTED IN STATE 
CRIMINAL COURTS 4 (1997). 
 65. MICHAEL A. CORRIERO, JUDGING CHILDREN AS CHILDREN: A PROPOSAL FOR A 
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 14 (2006). 
 66. Some states provide for “once an adult, always an adult” transfer, which are laws 
that require prior juvenile adult transfers to always be prosecuted as an adult regardless of 
whether the offense is serious or not. Teigen, supra note 37. 
 67. CORRIERO, supra note 65, at 128 (referencing Laurence Steinberg, Should Juve-
nile Offenders Be Tried as Adults? A Developmental Prospective on Changing Legal Poli-
cies (Jan. 19, 2000), http://willamette.edu/cla/additional-academic-
opportuni-
ties/debate/pdf/youth_forum/kpdc%20research/motion%202%20affirm/bongo_DATA%20
ON%20JUVENILES.pdf [https://perma.cc/7F5F-WM42]). 
 68. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 487–88 (2012) (“Of the 29 relevant 
jurisdictions, about half place at least some juvenile homicide offenders in adult court au-
tomatically, with no apparent opportunity to seek transfer to juvenile court. Moreover, sev-
eral States at times lodge this decision exclusively in the hands of prosecutors, again with no 
statutory mechanism for judicial reevaluation.”). 
 69. MINN. STAT. § 645.451, subdiv. 3 (2018). 
 70. § 645.451, subdiv. 2. 
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“crime” due to their mental capacity and consequently cannot be tried in 
adult court.
71
 While the age of adulthood has not changed, the laws gov-
erning criminal punishments for different ages have.  
Minnesota established a separate court for juveniles under the age of 
seventeen in 1905.
72
 The juvenile court was created to have jurisdiction 
over individuals under the age of eighteen, but it does not possess jurisdic-
tion over those sixteen or older in certain situations.
73
 The court can also 
“certify” an individual over the age of fourteen to be tried as an adult.
74
 
Prior to the 1990s, certification of a juvenile to adult court was “often diffi-
cult to obtain even for very violent offenses, and w[as] based in large part 
upon the testimony of psychologists and psychiatrists.”
75
 The heightened 
crime rates of the 1980s and 1990s, however, prompted a change in the 
certification process.
76
 When the certification process changed, juveniles 
were no longer considered inherently less culpable.
77
 Instead they were 
considered a threat to public safety. So, the burden of proof shifted to the 
 
 71. § 609.055, subdiv. 1. 
 72. See generally An Act to Regulate the Treatment and Control of Dependent, 
Neglected and Delinquent Children, ch. 285, sec. 3, 1905 Minn. Laws 419, 
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/laws/1905/0/General+Laws/Chapter/285/pdf/ 
[https://perma.cc/A8XH-Z99Q] (codified at MINN. STAT. § 7164 (1913)). The act 
stemmed from Cook County, Illinois, which founded the first juvenile court in 1899. See 
Wright S. Walling & Stacia Walling Driver, 100 Years of Juvenile Court in Minnesota—A 
Historical Overview and Perspective, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 883, 889 (2006) (provid-
ing a comprehensive review of the creation of the juvenile court). 
 73. MINN. STAT. § 260B.007, subdiv. 6 (2018); §§ 260B.101, 225.  
 74. Juvenile Delinquency, MINN. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.mncourts.gov/Help-
Topics/Juvenile-Delinquency.aspx https://perma.cc/DB3D-TWLM]; see, e.g., MINN. 
STAT. § 260B.125, subdiv. 1 (2018) (providing that children aged fourteen and older who 
are charged with a felony-level offense can be certified by the juvenile court and transferred 
to adult court); MINN. STAT. § 609.055 (2018). 
 75. JAMES C. BACKSTROM, EXTENDED JUVENILE JURISDICTION “ONE MORE STRIKE 
AND YOU’RE OUT!” MINNESOTA’S BLENDED SENTENCING LAW 2 (1998), 
https://www.co.dakota.mn.us/Government/Attorney/WorkExperience/Documents/Extend
edJuvenileJurisdictionBlendedSentencingLaw.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NKS-AKT2]. 
 76. See generally Kim Taylor-Thompson, Minority Rule: Redefining the Age of 
Criminality, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 143, 143–200 (2014). Between 1984 and 
1998 the number of juvenile petitions increased by 325 percent from 15,000 to more than 
63,000. See Dana Swayze & Danette Buskovick, Back to the Future: Thirty Years of Min-
nesota Juvenile Justice Policy and Procedure, 1980–2010, MINN. DEPT. OF PUB. SAFETY 
OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS 2 (2014), 
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2014/other/140424.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7RS-4K7V]. 
 77. MINN. STAT. § 260B.001, subdiv. 2 (2018) (“The purpose of the laws relating to 
children alleged or adjudicated to be delinquent is to promote the public safety and reduce 
juvenile delinquency by maintaining the integrity of the substantive law prohibiting certain 
behavior and by developing individual responsibility for lawful behavior.). 
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juvenile to show by “clear and convincing evidence” that they were suitable 
for treatment in the juvenile system instead of adult court.
78
 Once a child is 
moved to adult court, juvenile court jurisdiction ends.
79
  
The certification process and the consideration of multiple offenses 
does not always consider whether an individual had the mental capacity to 
warrant adult jurisdiction. Instead, the state and legislature demand the 
courts look at an individual’s age to determine what punishment is war-
ranted. For example, a sixteen-year-old may use tear gas,
80
 but only eight-
een-year-olds can use a stun gun
81
—a violation of either rule is a misde-
meanor.
82
 Furthermore, persons under age sixteen can hunt
83
 but may not 
possess a firearm—unless they meet an exception, such possession will re-
sult in a misdemeanor.
84
 These laws are just some examples of the incon-
sistent age laws present in Minnesota’s system.  
IV. SCIENCE BEHIND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: CULPABILITY AND 
CAPABILITIES  
Society recognizes the difference in mental capacity by limiting cer-
tain rights—such as requiring heightened ages to consume alcohol or rent a 
car—to persons over the age of eighteen.
85
 Despite eighteen being deemed 
 
 78. BACKSTROM, supra note 75, at 4.  
 79. MINN. STAT. § 260B.125 (2018) (“When a child is alleged to have committed, 
after becoming 14 years of age, an offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult, 
the juvenile court may enter an order certifying the proceeding for action under the laws 
and court procedures controlling adult criminal violations.”); see Minn. R. of Juv. Delinq. 
Pro. R. 18.01 subdiv. 2 (“The district court has original and exclusive jurisdiction in crimi-
nal proceedings concerning a child alleged to have committed murder in the first degree 
after becoming sixteen (16) years of age. Upon the filing of a complaint or indictment 
charging a sixteen (16) or seventeen (17) year old child in adult court proceedings with the 
offense of first-degree murder, juvenile court jurisdiction terminates for all proceedings 
arising out of the same behavioral incident.”). 
 80. § 624.731. 
 81. Id. 
 82. § 624.731 subdiv. 8. 
 83. MINN. STAT. § 97A.451 (2018). 
 84. § 97B.021. 
 85. See National Minimum Drinking Age Act, 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1984) (mandating 
that states who allow persons under 21 years of age to purchase and possess alcohol will 
have their federal highway apportionment fee reduced by ten percent); Under 25 Car 
Rental, HERTZ, 
https://www.hertz.com/rentacar/misc/index.jsp?targetPage=Hertz_Renting_to_Drivers_Un
der_25.jsp [https://perma.cc/J4WP-9VSZ] (“While Hertz happily rents to customers 20 
and above, there is an added surcharge under some circumstances for renters between 20 
and 24 years old.”). 
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the age of adulthood by lawmakers, the brain is not fully formed until the 
mid-twenties. In fact, most reasoning and decision-making parts of the 
brain continue developing until the mid-twenties.  
A. Psychological and Scientific Research Show Brains Are Not Fully 
Developed Until Age Twenty-Seven 
During much of the 1900s, many believed that the human brain was 
almost completely formed and unchanging after childhood.
86
 However, 
scientific discoveries show evidence of “neuroplasticity,” which challenges 
this assumption.
87
 Adolescence is roughly defined as the period between 
the onset of puberty and adulthood maturity, which may last from age ten 
to age twenty-five.
88
 Research performed by numerous scientists
89
 shows 
that the areas of the brain responsible for impulse control and executive 
functioning undergo drastic changes throughout this stage.
90
  
B. Risk-taking and the Relationship to Cognitive Development 
Adolescent risk-taking is controlled by two systems: the socioemo-
tional and cognitive control systems.
91
 The socioemotional system is re-
 
 86. Daniel Weitz, The Brains Behind Mediation: Reflections on Neuroscience, Con-
flict Resolution and Decision-Making, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 471 (2011) (ref-
erencing NORMAN DOIDGE, THE BRAIN THAT CHANGES ITSELF 248, i (2007)). 
 87. Id. at xix. 
 88. COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, EMERGING CONCEPTS BRIEF: WHAT ARE THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF ADOLESCENT BRAIN DEVELOPMENT FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE? 1 (2006), 
http://www.juvjustice.org/sites/default/files/resource-files/resource_134.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8NP2-E9FD]. 
 89. See Tracy Rightmer, Arrested Development: Juveniles’ Immature Brains Make 
Them Less Culpable Than Adults, 9 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. 1 (2005) (referencing Jay 
N. Giedd, Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Adolescent Brain, 1021 ANNALS 
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 77 (2004); Beatriz Luna & John A. Sweeney, The Emergence of Collabo-
rative Brain Function: fMRI Studies of the Development of Response Inhibition, 1021 
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 296 (2004); Elizabeth Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain 
Growth and Gray Matter Density Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse Relation-
ships During Postadolescent Brain Maturation, 21 J. NEUROSCIENCE 8819 (2001); Law-
rence Steinberg, Risk Taking in Adolescence What Changes and Why?, 1021 ANNALS 
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 51 (2004)). 
 90. Rightmer, supra note 89, at 4. 
 91. Samantha Schad, Adolescent Decision Making: Reduced Culpability in the Crim-
inal Justice System and Recognition of Capability in Other Legal Contexts, 14 J.  HEALTH 
CARE L. & POL’Y 375, 377 (2011) (referencing Praveen Kambam & Christopher Thomp-
son, The Development of Decision-Making Capacities in Children and Adolescents: Psy-
chological and Neurological Perspective and Their Implications for Juvenile Defendants, 
27 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 173, 176 (2009); Laurence Steinberg, Age Differences in Sensation 
13
Colbert and Kroeger: Convicting Juveniles to Life Without Parole
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 45. Iss. 4, Art. 2 
1114 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:2 
sponsible for processing emotions and balancing of rewards versus pun-
ishment.
92
 The cognitive control system, located in the prefrontal cortex, 
controls higher executive functions such as impulse control, future orienta-
tion, and deliberation.
93
 The socioemotional and cognitive control systems 
work together when an adolescent decides to act.
94
 The interplay between 
the two systems can affect an adolescent's decision to commit a crime, 
their ability to participate in criminal proceedings, and even their response 
to interrogation tactics.
95
  
The socioemotional system—the reward-seeking function—is highly 
active in adolescents.
96
 Puberty causes a restructuring of dopamine levels 
within the brain where dopaminergic activity in the prefrontal cortex in-
creases significantly.
97
 Dopamine is a neurotransmitter that transmits sig-
nals between nerve cells when learning about rewards, essentially making a 
person feel good.
98
 For adolescents, the increase of dopamine occurs be-
fore the control systems in the prefrontal cortex mature.
99
 So, the adoles-
cent brain, full of dopaminergic reward-seeking activity, is particularly sen-
sitive to seeking this feel-good dopamine.
100
 According to research on 
adolescent risk-taking, “[b]ecause dopamine plays a critical role in the 
brain’s reward circuitry, the increase, reduction, and redistribution of do-
pamine receptor concentration during puberty, especially in projections 
from the limbic system to the prefrontal area, is likely to increase reward 
seeking behavior and accordingly, sensation seeking.”
101
 One way adoles-
cents seek dopamine release is through peer approval and acceptance.
102
  
 
Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed by Behavior and Self-Report: Evidence for a Dual Sys-
tems Model, 44 DEV. PSYCHOL. 1764 (2008)).  
 92. Steinberg, supra note 57, at 54. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Explaining Juvenile False Confessions: Adolescent 
Development and Police Interrogation, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 53 (2007). 
 96. Kambam & Thompson, The Development of Decision-Making Capacities in 
Children and Adolescents: Psychological and Neurological Perspective and Their Implica-
tions for Juvenile Defendants, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 173, 176 (2009). 
 97. Steinberg, supra note 57, at 54. 
 98. See Richard D. Palmiter, Is Dopamine a Physiologically Relevant Mediator of 
Feeding Behavior?, 30 TRENDS IN NEUROSCIENCES 375, 375–381 (2007). 
 99. See B.J. Casey, Sarah Getz & Adriana Galvan, The Adolescent Brain, 28 DEV. 
REV. 62, 70 (2008). 
 100. Schad, supra note 91, at 378. 
 101. Id. (citing Steinberg, supra note 57, at 54). 
 102. See Leah H. Somerville, The Teenage Brain: Sensitivity to Social Evaluation, 22 
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 121, 121 (2011). 
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The cognitive control system, which controls impulses and considers 
future implications, does not fully form until the mid-to-late twenties.
103
 
The prefrontal cortex, which is responsible for more future-thinking con-
trol, controlling impulses, and planning ahead—the hallmarks of adult be-
havior—is one of the last to mature.
104
 Underdeveloped aspects of cognitive 
control, combined with reward-seeking behavior from dopamine levels, 
tend to result in risky behavior.
105
 Furthermore, adolescent youths’ lack of 
experience makes them less aware of risks,
106
 such as criminal responsibil-
ity.  
By adulthood, cognitive capacity for impulse control fully develops.
107
 
This self-regulation and life experience makes an adult better equipped to 
resist impulses.
108
 Research in the social and neurological sciences shows 
that, although young people develop at different rates, overall, adolescents 
tend to be less mature than adults.
109
 This “research confirms a guiding 
principle—the distinction between youth and adults is not simply one of 
age, but one of motivation, impulse control, judgment, culpability and 
physiological maturation.”
110
 Many states recognize that adolescence is a 
time for youth to learn through trial and error because the “laws reflect so-
cietal understanding that adolescents do not have the ability to fully under-
stand adult responsibilities or appreciate potentially grave, long-term con-
sequences.”
111
  
 As will be discussed later, since the 1960s, Supreme Court rulings 
have accepted findings in adolescent brain science through banning the 
use of capital punishment for juveniles,
112
 limiting life without parole sen-
 
 103. See Steinberg, supra note 57, at 54. 
 104. NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, THE TEEN BRAIN: STILL UNDER 
CONSTRUCTION 3 (NIH Pub. No. 11–4929 2011). 
 105. See Charles Geier & Beatriz Luna, The Maturation of Incentive Processing and 
Cognitive Control, 93 PHARMACOLOGICAL BIOCHEMISTRY & BEHAV. 212, 217–18 (2009). 
 106. Schad, supra note 91, at 378. 
 107. Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-
Taking, 28 DEV. REV. 78, 99 (2008). 
 108. Id.; see also CORRIERO, supra note 65, at 29 (“Self-control . . . is the habit of be-
havior which can be developed over a period of time, a habit dependent on the experience 
of successfully exercising it. This particular type of maturity, like so many others, takes 
practice.”) (quoting Professor Frank Zimring). 
 109. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A De-
velopmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 
157–71 (1997) (citing ROBERT SIEGLER, CHILDREN’S THINKING 49-57 (2d ed. 1991)). 
 110. COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 88, at 2. 
 111. Id. at 1. For additional examples see Part II (discussing ages for purchasing to-
bacco, gambling, drinking, and consent). 
 112. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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tences to homicide offenders,
113
 banning the use of mandatory life without 
parole,
114
 and retroactively applying
115
 the unconstitutionality of life without 
parole decision for offenders under the age of eighteen.
116
  
V. STATE V. NELSON: THE BRIGHT LINE RULE IN ACTION 
A. Facts 
In 1995, Jonas Nelson was born into an unhappy family.
117
 Jonas’s fa-
ther, Richard Nelson, was abusive and controlling.
118
 Jonas’s mother left his 
father in 2010 because she feared for the safety of herself and her chil-
dren.
119
 In August 2013, after patterns of misbehavior, Ms. Singer sent Jo-
nas to live with his father.
120
 Some time had passed, and Jonas reached out 
to his mother, complaining that “his father was not allowing him to work, 
drive, or do anything and that he felt secluded and alone. He told his 
friends that his father was being ‘very strict and unfair’ and not to be fooled 
by his father’s nice-guy act.”
121
 
On December 30, 2013, Jonas turned eighteen.
122
 One week later, on 
January 6, 2014, Jonas phoned 911 and reported his father had been 
murdered.
123
 Mr. Nelson was found dead on the living room floor from a 
gunshot wound to the head.
124
 Jonas’s original description of the night was 
that “he was upstairs watching a movie when he heard what sounded like 
glass breaking and a ‘pop.’”
125
 Jonas then went downstairs and found his 
father’s body and called 911.
126
 However, after a series of interrogations 
lasting from 11:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m., Jonas proceeded to tell the investiga-
tors that he had walked downstairs from his bedroom to get a glass of wa-
 
 113. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 114. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
 115. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 1546 (2016).  
 116. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, POLICY BRIEF: JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 1 
(2016), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Juvenile-Life-Without-
Parole.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TTG-V2NV]. 
 117. See Brief and Addendum for Appellant, State v. Nelson, 886 N.W.2d 505 
(Minn. 2016) (No. A15-1821), 2016 WL 4212309, at *6. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at *7.  
 121. Id. (citations omitted). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Brief and Addendum for Appellant, supra note 117, at *7. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at *8.  
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ter, picked up a .300 Remington Ultra Magnum bolt-action rifle and am-
munition from the gun cabinet in the den, and shot his father in the head 
as he slept on the living room floor.
127
 “He said he knew from television 
shows there would be ‘penalties’ - 'they say criminals get eight years in 
prison’ - but ‘I'm not worried.’”
128
 
B. Procedure and Holding 
Following a jury trial, Jonas Nelson was found guilty of several offens-
es, including first-degree premediated murder,
129
 second-degree intentional 
murder,
130
 and second-degree unintentional felony murder.
131
 The district 
court sentenced Nelson to life in prison without the possibility of release 
pursuant to Minnesota statutes section 609.106, subdivision 2(1), for first-
degree premeditated murder.
132
 At the time of the sentencing, District 
Court Judge Terrence Conkel said, “[I] took no joy or satisfaction [in issu-
ing the sentence]. . . . I have never before sentenced a person as young as 
you to prison for so long.”
133
 
Nelson argued to the Minnesota Supreme Court that even though he 
was one week past his eighteenth birthday when he committed the offense, 
he was psychologically and socially still a juvenile.
134
 As a result, he argued 
that the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the 
possibility of release was unconstitutional under the United States Su-
preme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama.
135
 The Minnesota Supreme 
Court did not reach this claim because it had not been raised in the district 
court.
136
 Importantly, the court did not preclude Nelson from making this 
argument in post-conviction proceedings.
137
  
 
 127. Id. at *13. 
 128. Id.  
 129. MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a)(1). 
 130. § 609.19, subdiv. 1(1). 
 131. § 609.19, subdiv. 2(1). 
 132. State v. Nelson, 886 N.W.2d 505, 506, 508 (Minn. 2016). 
 133. Suzanne Rook, Nelson Found Guilty of Murder, Sentence to Life Without Pa-
role, LE CENTER LEADER (Aug. 10, 2015), 
http://www.southernminn.com/le_center_leader/news/article_2228b340-55b2-57ae-9424-
9a205b815466.html [https://perma.cc/8NSZ-PMG5]. 
 134. Nelson, 886 N.W.2d at 511. 
 135. Id. at 512 (citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012)). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. Nelson recently filed a post-conviction petition challenging his sentence.  
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C. Jonas—The Non-Juvenile Offender 
Jonas was eighteen and one week when he committed homicide. Jo-
nas underwent a psychological evaluation by Dr. Harlan Gilbertson, who 
administered an array of intelligence and psychiatric tests and determined 
that “Jonas, because his father had not let him make decisions, was ‘quite 
socially delayed’ and ‘probably 13 or 14 from a psychological stand-
point.’”
138
 Dr. Gilbertson also found Jonas suffered from a dysthymic dis-
order and PTSD; he was going through life following and doing, not ques-
tioning or arguing because he did not make decisions.
139
 So, while Jonas’s 
physical age was eighteen-and-one-week, his psychological age was closer 
to fourteen, an age that would allow for juvenile proceedings and ultimate-
ly make the mandatory life without parole sentence unconstitutional.
140
 
VI. ANALYSIS: THE CATEGORICAL CHALLENGE FOR NON-JUVENILE 
OFFENDERS 
The United States Supreme Court has explicitly held that “mandato-
ry life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their 
crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual 
punishments.’”
141
 In Miller, the Supreme Court did not address whether 
mandatory life without parole is necessarily constitutional as applied to 
those over the age of eighteen. However, because the constitutional prin-
ciples are premised on developmental maturity and capacity for rehabilita-
tion, not chronological age, Miller’s constitutional principles should apply 
equally to a defendant who, like Jonas Nelson, was just seven days past his 
eighteenth birthday at the time of his offense. 
The Supreme Court recognized that cognitive abilities impact an in-
dividual’s ability to assess committing a serious offense that could be wor-
thy of an adult sentence.
142
 The Supreme Court also recognized that ado-
lescents are unfinished products, developmentally and morally, and that 
these factors hold constitutional significance.
143
 Consequently, the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment does not 
 
 138. Brief and Addendum for Appellant, State v. Nelson, 886 N.W.2d 505 (Minn. 
2016). (No. A15-1821), 2016 WL 4212309, at *15. 
 139. Id.  
 140. See Brief and Addendum for Appellant, supra note 117, at *30–31 (citing Miller 
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469 (2012)). 
 141. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012). 
 142. Id. at 472; see supra Part V. 
 143. Miller, 567 U.S. at 472; see also Kim Taylor-Thompson, Minority Rule: Redefin-
ing the Age of Criminality, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 143, 146 (2014). 
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limit the prohibition against life without the possibility of parole to those 
under the age of eighteen; rather, the Eighth Amendment requires that 
multiple factors should be taken into account to determine an individual’s 
psychological age, such as maturity, intelligence, experience, and ability to 
comprehend before a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of 
parole can be imposed.
144
  
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
145
 This means that “the State 
must respect the human attributes even of those who have committed se-
rious crimes.”
146
  
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment requires that “punishment for crime should be graduated and pro-
portioned to [the] offense.”
147
 This proportionality principle requires the 
court to evaluate “‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the pro-
gress of a maturing society’ to determine which punishments are so dis-
proportionate as to be cruel and unusual.”
148
 
Over the last several decades, the Court has issued a series of deci-
sions that stand for the proposition that, under the Eighth Amendment, 
juvenile defendants are categorically less culpable than others and, there-
fore, constitutionally different for purposes of sentencing, specifically the 
death penalty. 
In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court considered whether it was 
constitutional to execute a fifteen-year-old person.
149
 The Court concluded 
that it was not constitutional because, based on scientific findings, adoles-
 
 144. State v. Critt, 554 N.W.2d 93 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996). These categories reflect 
qualities necessary to determine if a confession is voluntary. See id. This writer believes that 
if a court could find a confession is voluntary based on these qualities, the court would also 
determine the person had a mature mental state. 
 145. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 146. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010). 
 147. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002)). 
 148. Id. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958)). 
 149. 487 U.S. 815, 821–23 (1988) (“In performing that task the Court has reviewed 
the work product of state legislatures and sentencing juries, and has carefully considered 
the reasons why a civilized society may accept or reject the death penalty in certain types of 
cases. Thus, in confronting the question whether the youth of the defendant—more specifi-
cally, the fact that he was less than 16 years old at the time of his offense—is a sufficient rea-
son for denying the State the power to sentence him to death, we first review relevant legis-
lative enactments, then refer to jury determinations, and finally explain why these indicators 
of contemporary standards of decency confirm our judgment that such a young person is 
not capable of acting with the degree of culpability that can justify the ultimate penalty.”). 
19
Colbert and Kroeger: Convicting Juveniles to Life Without Parole
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 45. Iss. 4, Art. 2 
1120 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:2 
cents have less capacity to control their conduct and think in long-range 
terms.
150
 Moreover, adolescents differ from adults because they have not 
achieved independence from parental control. The Court also noted that 
crimes committed by a young person represent a failure of family, school, 
and the social system.
151
 While a young person should not be absolved of 
responsibility for his actions, his transgressions are not as morally repre-
hensible as that of an adult.
152
 In Thompson, the Supreme Court conclud-
ed for the first time that a class of punishment was categorically dispropor-
tionate and in derogation of society’s evolving standards of decency when 
imposed upon a youthful offender.
153
 
In Roper v. Simmons,
154
 the Supreme Court declared the death pen-
alty unconstitutional for juvenile defendants. There, the Court recognized 
that a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are 
found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable 
among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-
considered actions and decisions.”
155
 Additionally, the Court discussed that 
youths still struggle to define their identity; thus, even a heinous crime 
committed by a youth is less supportable than one by an adult, due to a 
lack of depraved character in the youth.
156
 The Court reasoned that given 
the lessened culpability, youths should not be subject to the same offenses 
as adults:   
Whether viewed as an attempt to express the community's mor-
al outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to 
the victim, the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor 
as with an adult. Retribution is not proportional if the law's most 
severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blame-
worthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of 
youth and immaturity.
157
 
 
 150. Id. at 834 (noting that Justice Powel in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115, 
n.11 (1982), quoted the 1978 Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sen-
tencing Policy Toward Young Offenders; thus the Court endorsed the view that adoles-
cence is a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence 
and psychological damage).  
 151. Id. at 834. 
 152. Id. at 838. 
 153. Id. at 821–38 (holding that categorically, capital punishment, per the Eighth 
Amendment, “prohibits the execution of a person who was under 16 years of age at the 
time of his or her offense”). 
 154. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 155. Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
 156. Id. at 570. 
 157. Id. at 571. 
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The Court also noted that youth and immaturity undermine another 
goal of criminal sentencing: deterrence. The Court recognized that the 
likelihood of a teenager weighing the consequences or possibility of execu-
tion is nonexistent.
158
 Moreover, the Court weighed that it is difficult even 
for expert psychologists to differentiate between a juvenile offender’s cul-
pability and transient immaturity.
159
 Thus, due to their mental state, juve-
niles cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders.
160
 
The Supreme Court extended this reasoning to sentences other than 
death in Graham v. Florida,
161
 where the Court declared life in prison 
without parole was unconstitutional for juvenile defendants who had not 
committed homicide. In Graham, the Court relied on psychology and 
brain science, noting that parts of the brain involved in behavior control 
continue to mature through late adolescence.
162
 The Court concluded that 
brain development is relevant to the status of the offender and should be 
considered next to the nature of the offense to which a harsh penalty may 
apply.
163
 “It follows that, when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile 
offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral 
culpability. The age of the offender and the nature of the crime each bear 
on the analysis.”
164
   
In Miller, the Supreme Court drew upon its decisions in Thompson, 
Roper, and Graham to establish a substantive constitutional rule banning 
life without parole for all but the rarest of juveniles.
165
 An offender’s age is 
relevant in determining the appropriate punishment insofar that develop-
ments in brain science continue to show fundamental differences in juve-
nile and adult minds.
166
 As a result, criminal procedure laws that fail to take 
a defendant’s youthfulness into account are fundamentally flawed.
167
  
 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. 
 161. 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010). 
 162. Id.; see Brief for American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Neither Party at 16–24, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621), 
2009 WL 2247127; Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 22–27, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-
7621), 2009 WL 2236778. 
 163. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68–69.  
 164. Id. at 69. 
 165. 567 U.S. 460, 476–79 (2012) (stating that capital defendants have the opportunity 
to demonstrate mitigating circumstances surrounding the act so that “the death penalty is 
reserved only for the most culpable defendants committing the most serious offenses”). 
 166. Id. at 471–72. 
 167. Id. at 472–73. 
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[Children] “are more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and 
outside pressures,” including from their family and peers; they 
have limited “contro[l] over their own environment” and lack 
the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing 
settings. And because a child's character is not as “well formed” 
as an adult's, his traits are “less fixed” and his actions less likely 
to be “evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].”
168
 
At the heart of this constitutional evolution is an increasingly settled 
and sophisticated body of research documenting the distinct emotional, 
psychological, and neurological attributes of youth. Through a series of 
decisions, the Supreme Court has held that, because adolescents are de-
velopmentally distinct from adults, sentencing courts must consider juve-
niles’ “lessened culpability,” “greater ‘capacity for change,’” and individual 
characteristics before imposing the harshest available sentences.
169
   
Before sentencing a juvenile to life without parole, a court must “take 
into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel 
against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison,” the Miller 
Court explained.
170
 The Court went on to specify five “Miller factors” that 
a sentencing court must consider before sentencing a juvenile to life with-
out parole, including: (1) the juvenile's “chronological age” and related 
“immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequenc-
es;”(2) the juvenile’s “family and home environment that surrounds him;” 
(3) “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his 
participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may 
have affected him;” (4) the “incompetencies associated with youth” in deal-
ing with law enforcement and a criminal justice system designed for adults; 
and (5) “the possibility of rehabilitation.”
171
 Prior to imposing a juvenile life 
without parole sentence, the sentencing judge must consider how these 
factors impact the juvenile’s overall culpability.
172
 
 “Miller’s central intuition” was “that children who commit even hei-
nous crimes are capable of change,” the Court stated four years later in 
Montgomery v. Louisiana.
173
 Miller established a “substantive” rule of 
criminal law which did not merely proscribe mandatory life without parole 
for juveniles but created a presumption that only those “rare” juveniles 
 
 168. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)).  
 169. Id. at 465 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68, 74 (2010)) 
 170. Id. at 480.   
 171. Id. at 477–78. 
 172. Id. 
 173. 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016). 
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whose offenses reflect “permanent incorrigibility” can be sentenced to 
terms that deprive them of a meaningful opportunity for release.
174
   
The Court explained that the constitutional flaws in mandatory sen-
tences of life without parole for juveniles are the denial of prospects for 
release; the  “preclu[sion] [of] consideration of his chronological age and 
its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to 
appreciate risks and consequences”; the “prevent[ion] [of] taking into ac-
count the family and home environment that surrounds him,” and the 
“neglect[] [of] the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the ex-
tent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pres-
sures may have affected him.”
175
 Not least, “this mandatory punishment 
disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances 
most suggest it.”
176
  
Though these constitutional decisions involved defendants who were 
under eighteen at the time of their offenses, the Supreme Court did not 
address what to do with those individuals who are just over eighteen; that 
is, just over the line established twelve years ago in Roper—as adopted by 
Miller—but to whom all of the various Eighth Amendment concerns about 
protecting juveniles from disproportionate punishment apply with equal 
force. As the Court noted in Roper:  
[d]rawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the 
objections always raised against categorical rules. The qualities 
that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an 
individual turn 18. By the same token, some under 18 have al-
ready attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach.
177
 
The Supreme Court has refused to draw bright lines in a closely re-
lated area of the law—the application of the death penalty against those 
with intellectual disability. In Hall v. Florida, the Court considered wheth-
er the state could determine whether an individual is intellectually disabled 
based solely on an I.Q. point threshold.
178
 Under Florida’s statute, if a de-
fendant was found to have an I.Q. score above 70, “sentencing courts 
[could not] consider even substantial and weighty evidence of intellectual 
disability” such as “medical histories, behavioral records, school tests and 
reports, and testimony regarding past behavior and family circumstanc-
es.”
179
  
 
 174. Id. at 743. 
 175. Miller, 576 U.S. at 477.   
 176. Id. at 478.   
 177. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005). 
 178. 572 U.S. 701, 707 (2014). 
 179. Id. at 712. 
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Comparing the approaches of various states to determining intellec-
tual disability disqualification for the death penalty and relying on the di-
agnostic practices of the American Psychiatric Association, the Court ruled 
that “the law requires that [the defendant] have the opportunity to present 
evidence of his intellectual disability,” as opposed to subjecting him to a 
mandatory scheme based on a single factor.
180
  
Miller’s ban on mandatory life without parole sentences is based not 
on chronological line drawing, but on the Court’s conclusion that the neu-
rological differences between youth and adults undermine the justifications 
for subjecting those whose brains are still developing to the harshest sen-
tences. Notably, research now shows that these neurological and behavior-
al characteristics are also present in eighteen-year-olds, and federal and 
state courts have relied on this research to invalidate sentencing schemes 
that require courts to sentence eighteen-year-olds to life in prison without 
possibility of parole.
181
 
The Court’s declaration that youth “are constitutionally different 
from adults for purposes of sentencing” rests not on bright line age distinc-
tions, but on the Court’s recognition that, because of their immaturity, 
young people, as a group, are less culpable for offenses committed and 
more capable of rehabilitation.
182
 In Roper, the Court for the first time re-
lied on a burgeoning body of scientific literature to support “[what] any 
parent knows”—that children are different than adults.
183
 The “relevance of 
youth as a mitigating factor derives from the fact that the signature qualities 
of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and reck-
lessness that may dominate in younger years can subside.”
184
 “For most 
teens, [risky or antisocial] behaviors are fleeting; they cease with maturity 
as individual identity becomes settled.”
185
 By the time the Court rendered 
its opinions in Graham and Miller, scientific evidence had assumed a 
more central role in the Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis.
186
 
 
 180. Id. at 724. 
 181. See e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 460 (2012); State v. Critt, 554 N.W.2d 
93 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996). 
 182. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471.   
 183. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
 184. Id. (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Ad-
olescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death 
Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009 (2003)). 
 185. Id. (citing Steinberg & Scott, supra note 184, at 1009). 
 186. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (“Our decisions rested not only on common sense—on 
what ‘any parent knows’—but on science and social science as well.”); Graham v. Florida, 
560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (“[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to show 
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”). 
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Because of the fundamental developmental differences, the Supreme 
Court has concluded that juveniles are inherently less culpable than adults, 
and, thus, the penological justifications for the death penalty and life im-
prisonment without the possibility of parole apply to juveniles with less 
force.
187
 Retribution is less justifiable because the actions of a juvenile are 
less morally reprehensible than those of an adult due to a juvenile’s dimin-
ished culpability.
188
 Similarly, deterrence is less effective because juveniles’ 
“impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions” make them “less 
likely to take a possible punishment into consideration when making deci-
sions.”
189
 Incapacitation is not applicable because juveniles’ personality 
traits are less fixed and therefore it is difficult for experts to “differentiate 
between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transi-
ent immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irrepa-
rable corruption.”
190
 Finally, rehabilitation cannot be the basis for life im-
prisonment without parole because that “penalty forswears altogether the 
rehabilitative ideal” by “denying the defendant the right to reenter the 
community.”
191
 
These same characteristics relied upon by the Supreme Court to limit 
the punishment on juveniles apply equally to people over the age of eight-
een with scholars explaining that “[o]ver the past decade, developmental 
psychologists and neuroscientists have found that biological and psycho-
logical development continues into the early twenties, well beyond the age 
of majority.”
192
 Scientists now know that, within the human brain, the areas 
responsible for movement and sensory perception develop first, followed 
by cognitive and executive skills, which develop throughout adolescence.
193
 
Among the last to develop are the areas of the brain required for weighing 
risks, making reasoned decisions, and controlling impulses, which develop 
throughout the late teens and twenties.
194
 
 
 187. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 472–73; Graham, 560 U.S. at 69–74; Roper, 543 U.S. at 
570–71.  
 188. Graham, 560 U.S. at 71. 
 189. Id. at 72. 
 190. Id. at 72–73 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 572). 
 191. Id. at 74. 
 192. Elizabeth S. Scott, Richard J. Bonnie, & Laurence Steinberg, Young Adulthood 
as a Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social Change, and Justice Policy, 85 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 641, 642 (2016). 
 193. Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development During 
Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROC NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8174 (2004). 
 194. Terry A. Maroney, The Once and Future Juvenile Brain, in CHOOSING THE 
FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 189, 193 (Franklin E. Zimring & David S. 
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It is now well established that “young adulthood is a developmental 
period when cognitive capacity is still vulnerable to the emotional influ-
ences that affect adolescent behavior, in part due to continued develop-
ment of prefrontal circuitry involved in self-control.”
195
 Neuroscientific 
studies show that the brains of eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds remain 
immature in three core areas that support self-control and emotional regu-
lation: the amygdala, the prefrontal cortex, and the ventral striatum.
196
 
These findings are supported by fMRI studies, which show that the vol-
ume of cortical gray matter in areas critical to integrating higher thought 
processing does not peak until the mid-twenties, and which results in a 
lack of structural development necessary for higher level reasoning and 
emotional regulation.
197
 These studies have led numerous scientists and 
scholars to agree that “young adult offenders aged 18–24 are more similar 
to juveniles than to adults with respect to their offending, maturation, and 
life circumstances.”
198
 
Increasingly, courts are relying on these contemporary neuroscientific 
findings about the brain development of young adults to forbid sentencing 
schemes that mandate life in prison without possibility of parole for eight-
een-year-old defendants. In Cruz v. United States, the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Connecticut concluded that “‘the Eighth Amendment 
forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility 
of parole’ for offenders who were 18 years old at the time of their 
crimes.”
199
 The Supreme Court held that the district court was not fore-
closed from imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, 
but the sentence is required “to take into account how adolescents, includ-
ing late adolescents, ‘are different, and how those differences counsel 
against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.’”
200
 
 
Tanenhaus eds., 2014); see also Steinberg, Social Neuroscience Perspective, supra note 
107.   
 195. Alexandra Cohen et al., When Does a Juvenile Become an Adult? Implications 
for Law and Policy, 88 TEMPLE L. REV. 769, 771 (2016). 
 196. See, e.g., B.J. Casey, Beyond Simple Models of Self-Control to Circuit-Based Ac-
counts of Adolescent Behavior, 66 ANNUAL REV. OF PSYCHOL. 295, 300 (2015). 
 197. See Gogtay, supra note 193, at 8174–79.   
 198. Rolf Loeber, David P. Farrington, & David Petechuk, Bulletin 1: From Juvenile 
Delinquency to Young Adult Offending (Study Group on the Transitions Between Juvenile 
Delinquency and Adult Crime), NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV. 20 (2013), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/242931.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CVT-3C2C]. 
 199. No. 11-CV-787, 2018 WL 1541898, at *25 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2018) (quoting 
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012)). 
 200. Id. (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 480). 
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In reaching its conclusion, the Cruz Court considered whether the 
scientific evidence justified distinguishing between those under eighteen 
and those who are eighteen.
201
 The Cruz Court first looked at the available 
scientific and sociological research that the United States Supreme Court 
considered in Roper, Graham, and Miller to identify differences between 
juveniles under the age of eighteen and fully mature adults—differences 
that the Supreme Court concluded undermined the penological justifica-
tions for the sentences in question.
202
 Cruz continued: 
The Supreme Court in these cases identified “[t]hree general 
differences between juveniles under 18 and adults”: (1) that ju-
veniles have a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility,” often resulting in “impetuous and ill-considered 
actions and decisions;” (2) that juveniles are “more vulnerable or 
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, includ-
ing peer pressure;” and (3) that “the character of a juvenile is not 
as well formed as that of an adult.” Because of these differences, 
the Supreme Court concluded that juveniles are less culpable 
for their crimes than adults and therefore the penological justifi-
cations for the death penalty and life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole apply with less force to them than to 
adults.”
203
  
The Cruz Court then considered those same characteristics and the 
expert testimony, articles, and studies provided by Temple University psy-
chology professor Dr. Laurence Steinberg, in which Dr. Steinberg stated 
that that he was “‘[a]bsolutely certain’ that the scientific findings that un-
derpin his conclusions about those under the age of 18 also apply to 18-
year-olds.”
204
  
Similarly, in State v. O’Dell,
205
 the Washington Supreme Court held 
that age is a mitigating factor in sentencing, even when the defendant is 
 
 201. Id. at *18–24 (citations omitted). The court also concluded that, where there are 
“some important societal lines remain at age 18, the changes discussed above reflect an 
emerging trend toward recognizing that 18-year-olds should be treated different from fully 
mature adults.” Id. at *22. 
 202. Id. at *22. 
 203. Id. at *22 (citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471–72 (2012); Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005)). 
 204. Id. at *23 (citing Alexandra Cohen et al., When Does a Juvenile Become an 
Adult? Implications for Law and Policy, 88 TEMPLE L. REV. 769 (2016); Laurence Stein-
berg et al., Around the World, Adolescence is a Time of Heightened Sensation Seeking 
and Immature Self-Regulation, 12532 DEV. SCI. 1, 1–13 (2017) (citation corrected)) (Doc. 
No. 115-1). 
 205. 358 P.3d 359, 366 (2015). 
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over the age of eighteen.
206
 Citing to Roper, the Washington court found 
that a sentence that may be proportional for an adult can be dispropor-
tionate as applied to a someone who committed an offense shortly after 
turning eighteen years old.
207
 Considering the implications of research find-
ings on adolescent brain development, the court stated: 
In light of what we know today about adolescents' cognitive and 
emotional development, we conclude that youth may, in fact, re-
late to [a defendant's] crime, that it is far more likely to diminish 
a defendant's culpability than this court implied in Ha'mim; and 
that youth can, therefore, amount to a substantial and compel-
ling factor, in particular cases, justifying a sentence below the 
standard range . . . For these reasons, a trial court must be al-
lowed to consider youth as a mitigating factor when imposing a 
sentence on an offender like O'Dell, who committed his offense 
just a few days after he turned 18.
208
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized, based on com-
mon sense, science, social science, and “[what] any parent knows”
209
—that 
juveniles are different. Because juveniles are different, the Court has pro-
hibited them from being put to death and has strictly limited the use of life 
without the possibility of parole. 
That same common sense, science, social science, and “[what] any 
parent knows,”
210
 leads inexorably to the conclusion that it is impossible to 
define “juvenile” as simply someone under the age of eighteen years old. 
“Juvenile” must be defined by the characteristics of the person, not simply 
their chronological age. 
 
 
 206. Id.  
 207. See id.  
 208. Id.  
 209. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
 210. Id. 
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